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7 Authority outside the State 
Non-State Actors and New Institutions in the Middle East 
Anne Marie Baylouny 
The Middle East appears rife with violent non-state actors operating outside 
domestic law and international norms. Through state incapacity, economic 
reforms, or war, increasing areas are untouched by state services or law. Ter-
ritories are becoming effectively stateless even in the geographic heart of the 
nominal state itself. States considered strong (Tunisia) or rich (Saudi Arabia) 
are similarly affected . Yet unlike Hobbes's nightmare of all-out competition 
and violence, the areas are in fact governed. Instead of chaos in spaces where 
state sovereignty is sparse or absent, alternative authorities arise . New actors 
and institutions fulfill roles previously considered the preserve of the state. 
Gangs, militias, thugs, local men of influence, and religious political parties 
are the main contenders for authority. These actors and their authority are 
not traditional or longstanding; they are newly successful, self-made leaders. 
They establish authority through services to the community and legitimate it 
in terms of religion, identity, or violence. 1 
Who governs areas unregulated by the state, and how is their authority 
generated? What must an individual do to become an authority?2 In most 
Western analyses of the Middle East, authorities are presumed to be preexist-
ing, carried over from traditional allegiances such as tribes and longstand-
ing wealthy or landowning families. Alternatively, non-state actors, whether 
armed or with political agendas, are assumed to either control the areas or 
be easily capable of doing so. Policymakers, journalists, and many scholars 
consider unregulated areas automatic prey to Islamists and other extremist 
136 
ideologies.3 The residents of the areas and their motivations for acknowledg-
ing one authority or another are typically missing from these descriptions. 
States and the international community fear the potential insecurity 
produced by these areas and the likelihood that they will harbor terrorists 
and criminals and foment civil unrest and rebellion against state authorities. 
These fears are sometimes but not always well founded. These security out-
comes are neither immediate nor direct but may be side effects of local rule 
based on alternative institutions and authority structures. Anti-state political 
organizing is not endemic to these areas but can arise when basic life concerns 
of residents are threatened. In many cases local institutions are weak and un-
able to reject troublemaking residents. In others, emerging actors and institu-
tions with more legitimacy than the absentee state regard the government as a 
threat to their existence and bond easily with outlaws in common cause. 
This chapter examines the constituent elements of authority in alter-
natively governed areas and finds that authority is tied to the provision of 
substantive services to the population.4 Yet while the social welfare services 
of Islamists have received much attention, it is not these practices that are 
central to authority, but rather policing and conflict resolution. The relations 
among residents in informal and unregulated areas are often problematic, 
complicated by mundane neighborhood concerns. Those able to regulate and 
organize relations, minimize conflict, and create peaceful order among the 
inhabitants have influence. With investment in the community, this can be-
come authority. Initially, influence can stem from market success, the threat 
of violence, or the organization of public space. If it is not utilized for conflict 
resolution, and if the power holder is not viewed as fair in his dealings with 
residents, however, he will not become an authority. 5 
Three variables govern the generation of authority in areas of the Mid-
dle East unregulated by the state: the initial basis for claiming influence, the 
method of legitimation, and the services that popularly validate the claim to 
authority. Through an examination of the types of authority and their roles 
in Middle Eastern communities, I delineate the common institutions orga-
nized by non-state authorities. These institutions indicate what practices and 
services furnish authority, and ultimately legitimacy, in unregulated contexts. 
Many posit that demands for public goods that the state does not provide-
what Rodney Hall and Thomas Biersteker call "functional holes"-are inte-
gral to the rise of private authority. However, what specific goods and services 
confer authority to private non-state actors is not specified. I contribute to 
identifying the institutions and public goods that are at the heart of author-
ity creation in relatively ungoverned, or unregulated, spaces.6 Although the 
fulfillment of key functions leads to influence in the community and acqui-
escence to governance, this dynamic does not necessarily imply either legiti-
macy or approval. Notwithstanding the population's benefits from services 
and governance, non-state rule can be brutal, arbitrary, and oppressive, a fact 
not lost on the community.7 Through an examination of the central roles 
empowering local leaders, this study seeks to uncover community priorities, 
the institutions considered necessary for daily life. An aspiring authority-
unjust or not-who provides needed functions thus validates his prestige and 
leadership. 
Few studies explore the substance of alternative authorities in the Middle 
East from the grassroots perspective. This study utilizes existing scholarship 
in addition to the author's fieldwork to arrive at a hypothesis regarding au-
thority generation in these areas. Individuals become alternative authorities 
in large part by providing necessary and basic services. Alternative authori-
ties provide services of infrastructure, policing and arbitration, mediation 
with the state, social services, and welfare. Their activities can further extend 
to economic connections and business aid. This chapter begins by first pre-
senting the differing types of unregulated spaces and the various forms of au-
thority in them. It then examines each of the institutions that are created to 
substantiate authority and finally the prevalent forms of legitimation for that 
authority-religious, identity, and violent. Data are primarily from Egypt, 
Algeria, Tunisia, the Palestinian territories, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq, 
supplemented with research on other countries in the region. Data for the 
militias come from Lebanon. 
Types of Authorities, Their Spaces, and Services 
Many types of areas in the Middle East are outside state regulation. Most con-
sist of a dynamic mix of new groups and socioeconomic classes, including 
the long-urbanized middle and lower classes and individuals with full-time 
formal jobs. Opposition to the state in its law-and-order functions is essential 
to securing a livelihood in many of these cases; in others, it is a by-product 
of organizing separate services and local governance and locating allies in 
these pursuits.8 Contact with the state for residents of informal communities 
is necessarily adversarial because title to the land on which they live is not 
established. The majority of work in these areas also is informal.9 Residents 
experience state authority as a threat to home and work, as police attempt 
to shut down or extract bribes from informal employment and periodically 
evict the residents of informal housing. Governments regard these extralegal 
communities as security threats that potentially hide criminals or terrorists 
and therefore bulldoze shanties and evict residents or arrest them in security 
sweeps. 10 In 1991, for instance, Algerians living in informal housing voted for 
the main opposition party in Algeria, the Islamic Salvation Front, because 
they viewed their interests as similar. 11 De facto authorities who are able to 
mediate with the state and keep police away accrue prestige in informal com-
munities. The corruption oflaw enforcement often drives the populace to rely 
on intermediaries who are able to bribe and negotiate with officials of the 
state. Many local authorities invest heavily in cultivating a relationship with 
the state, and state authorities in turn informally rely upon these figures to 
mediate with residents of these unregulated spaces. The state has little direct 
relation with these citizens.12 
The inhabitants of areas unregulated by the state create a variety of indi-
vidual and collective arrangements to meet daily needs. Individual accom-
modations include tapping into existing utilities, such as water and power, off 
the meter and attempting to remain invisible to the state.13 Some residents are 
wary about any collective organizing, preferring to act alone. For others, col-
lective institutions of arbitration or policing and service provision are desir-
able. The latter can encompass basic public services such as electricity, water, 
sewage, and garbage disposal and can extend to the provision of day care or 
the organization of sports teams, tutoring, and personal loans. Policing in-
cludes arbitration of disputes and the regulation of social behavior in public 
spaces. In militia-controlled areas, services can be more elaborate, including 
the establishment of institutions for governance and justice. Leaders of lin-
eage and village associations are expected to furnish welfare and employment 
networks. There is, however, less demand for arbitration for these groups 
when members' residences are not geographically concentrated. 
The specific mix of institutions depends on capacity and need. Institutional 
capacity turns upon the existence of resources, potential leadership, and non-
competition among power holders. The needs and desires of residents and the 
type of unregulated space constitute the second layer of variables determin-
ing institutional outcomes. Ungoverned spaces vary in the services they re-
ceive from the state; some lack basic sewage, while others have fundamental 
infrastructure but not social welfare. The extreme cases are found in squatter 
settlements and refugee camps, where state services and basic infrastructure 
are often nonexistent. Militias that contest and supplant the authority of the 
state likewise rule over areas with numerous needs. When they claim to sub-
stitute for the state, the call for absent services falls on them, although an ad-
equate or any response is not necessarily forthcoming. 
In general, after infrastructure, the priorities in collective institutions are 
the arbitration of disputes and policing of public spaces, and the provision of 
social services. Authorities can extend this into moral governance, a role most 
often performed by religious and political groups rather than individuals. 
While institutional creation in these areas can be quite dynamic, the genera-
tion of new accommodations to meet daily needs is not a given. Many areas 
have little to none of the services described here. Furthermore, even when 
services exist, the population is not necessarily equally served; the resulting 
institutions are often arbitrary and discriminatory. 
Institutions for collective goods can be established only when a monopoly 
of power exists. Even in an area as small as an alleyway (hara), only one au-
thority figure dominates. Residents of informal settlements are able to identify 
the exact geographical boundaries of each power holder-where one's influ-
ence ends and another's begins.14 Competition constrains actors to struggle 
for dominance, forestalling the development of governance institutions. Mi-
litias in the Lebanese civil war that competed for control of territory, for in-
stance, did not establish governance and service institutions. Even when the 
ideological bent of one of the approximately one hundred militias involved 
in that conflict promoted service and governance institutions, the group was 
unable to do so without a political monopoly and territorial control. 
Alternative authorities generally start out as newcomers to the power 
game, concerned with obtaining a higher social status. They begin their claim 
to influence with either economic success or physical ability. These individu-
als made money and connections or obtained influence through the use of 
violence. In both cases, they must also have a reputation for fairness, hon-
esty, and good works in the community. A reputation as a man of honor can 
be obtained through repeated interactions with constituents, but this takes 
time. Patronage of religious institutions, by contrast, is a fast but not manda-
tory method for demonstrating moral uprightness, and religion can serve as a 
shortcut to such a reputation. Militias can also impose their authority purely 
through force, but they usually also rely on political ideologies to justify their 
rule. Nevertheless, religion, political ideology, and reputation are not suffi-
cient to cement a position of authority. To become an authority, one must fur-
nish services and mediate with state authorities. Would-be authorities either 
intercede with state institutions on behalf of community members or replace 
the state entirely. 
Authorities in unplanned or informal settlements are often successful mer-
chants, real estate brokers, or contractors. They are known to residents and un-
derstood to deserve respect, deference, and admiration as men who have more 
power than those around them. Their status and influence are specific to a local 
area.15 They are active in local organizations and charities and have personal 
connections with police and state authorities. They intercede for residents when 
necessary, obtain permits for weddings, and assure that the police stay away. 
The relationship is not one-sided; the authority has responsibilities to care for 
residents, pay the cost of reconciliation meetings, and aid those in need. 
Violent authorities or specialists in violence obtain influence by forcibly 
ordering and policing unregulated spaces, often at the behest of residents . Mi-
litias order their territory by force; in some areas a militia and its accompany-
ing political party is often the only game in town for residents. The validation 
of these groups' authority comes from their physical prowess and success in 
battles, yet this form of legitimization alone does not suffice. Militia wars 
must be viewed as necessary by the populace. The thugs enforcing street order 
must be perceived to be honest and fair to their constituent population. 16 The 
provision of an acceptable level of social welfare and public goods by violent 
authorities is an advertisement for the group's ability to rule and a conse-
quence of their success in replacing the state. Political parties that rule refugee 
camps and militias that subjugate areas taken from the state assume a broad 
range of roles typically ascribed to the state, including infrastructure, polic-
ing, welfare, and moral governance. 
In the same way, leadership by identity-based authorities such as home-
town or kin associations accrues through their ability to provide aid, wel-
fare, and employment contacts. Power is accorded to potential leaders well 
connected in business and job circles or those tightly linked to the state and 
able to secure influence there.17 Affirmation of the identity's distinction from 
other social groups helps to solidify the unity of the organization.1s Here the 
priority of community public goods is clear, as the leaders are voted in or out 
of office on the basis of their provision of economic aid and job networks 
rather than their identity. 
Dispute Settlement and Policing 
Central to community cohesion are the policing of public space and fair ar-
bitration of disagreements among residents. Both can extend into normative 
governance. Local dispute settlement is particularly important as rules and 
ownership in these ungoverned territories are informal. Various problems 
occur that need to be resolved for the parties to continue to live in the same 
neighborhood. This can include fights started by children in which adults, 
including women, become physically involved. Sides are taken, and the life 
of the community is disrupted. Even when the dispute is over, a reconcilia-
tion meeting (musalaha) is often held to "bury the hatchet" and soothe sore 
feelings. Candidates who ran in local and national elections on the platform 
of services to residents of informal neighborhoods won the wholehearted sup-
port of those residents, particularly when the candidates acted against crimi-
nals in the community. 19 Islamic activists garner influence in neighborhoods 
through mediating social and economic disputes. 20 Not all disputes can be 
resolved, however, and community mechanisms are often ill-equipped for 
many such conflicts; for instance, the community often cannot handle prob-
lems involving violent individuals and drugs. The police nevertheless will not 
be called because residents believe their typical response is likely to be whole-
sale arrests, including of the victims. 
Local authorities also regulate social behavior in the street and public 
spaces. Responding to dangers for women in public areas is a common source 
of authority. In Algeria, where women faced problems with men when they 
went out in the streets, the local Islamists regulated male behavior in public, 
which spurred women to support the Islamists politically. The Islamist po-
litical party's platform incorporated concerns over threats in public spaces. 21 
ln areas of Tunisia, as a public space became unregulated by the state, it was 
taken over by drunk young men. Public drunkenness was a threat both to 
women and to their families' ability to use public spaces without being ha-
rassed. In the absence of state authority, female residents turned to religion, 
specifically the authority of the mosque, for help regulating the streets. The 
mosque took over the building where the drinking was taking place and en-
forced regulations for social behavior in public. While previously the mosque 
had had a marginal role in the quarter, it subsequently assumed the tasks of 
arbitrating right and wrong, proper and improper behavior, which gave its 
leaders a degree of civil authority within the community.22 
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Settlement of disputes is likewise a central role of militia institutions. The 
Lebanese Hizbullah, for example, take the lead in preventing intracommu-
nal squabbles that threaten the social order. The organization established a 
judicial system of courts to prosecute crimes and mediation to deal with the 
problem of blood feuds. In the event mediation is unsuccessful, Hizbullah 
leaders will forcibly impose solutions on the parties to keep vendettas from 
escalating into tit-for-tat murders. The organization has mediated more than 
two hundred such feuds since its establishment in the early to mid-1980s, en-
acted reconciliation rituals involving both parties, and itself paid a handsome 
portion of the compensation to the aggrieved parties. 23 
Militias perform actual policing. The impetus for the development of po-
licing institutions within militias stems from leaders' desire to prevent abuses 
of power among militia personnel themselves and thus maintain relations 
with the populace and preserve the militia hierarchy. The various militias of 
the Lebanese civil war established civil police bodies once their territory was 
secured. The earliest institutions of the Christian Lebanese Forces were set 
up to prevent crime and later evolved into a police force and military court 
system.24 In the Druze or Progressive Socialist Party militia territory, the Civil 
Association of the Mountain instituted a police force to enact quick punish-
ments, particularly for party members.25 The Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion (PLO) used the Palestinian Armed Struggle Command as a police force 
and provided mediation and adjudication. It established a revolutionary court 
to prosecute violations by armed forces and serious crimes by the populace 
and to mediate factional disputes. 26 Today, by contrast, many Palestinian 
camps in Lebanon are without funding or support from the PLO, and no 
single faction is in control. Popular committees representing all the main fac-
tions run the camps, but there are no mechanisms of accountability or polic-
ing. Charities related to Hamas operate in some of the camps but are unable 
to provide law and order because none is dominant. 27 
Public Services and Welfare 
Public infrastructure and welfare are some of the main services typically per-
formed by alternative authorities. From basic clean water, sewage, and utili-
ties, these services can extend to the organization of sports teams, tutoring 
for students, the lending of money, and the establishment of economic de-
velopment centers. As militias and political parties already are collectively 
and hierarchically organized, they have been the most efficient providers of 
public services. Residents of areas that lie outside the scope of state services 
take on a number of these tasks themselves. Identity groups build health clin-
ics and provide job training in addition to periodic financial aid, loans, and 
welfare stipends. 28 
The militias that held consolidated territory in Lebanon invested in elabo-
rate public services and welfare, but most began by providing basic infrastruc-
ture. The need for essential services such as clean water and electricity, for 
instance, spurred the formation of a public service administration for mem-
bers of the Druze community. Apart from the health and educational aid that 
came from international bodies, the PLO was almost completely responsible 
for the Palestinian camp community, from roads to sewage. Hizbullah in its 
infancy in the mid-1980s provided electricity, drinking water, and garbage 
collection for the southern suburbs of Beirut where government services were 
absent, and still furnishes water and garbage services. 
Others were more ambitious. The Lebanese Forces, a right-wing Chris-
tian coalition formed in the mid-1970s, furnished a wide array of services 
including security, infrastructure repairs, street cleaning, and garbage col-
lection through its Popular Committees.29 The Lebanese Forces' social ser-
vice institution also furnished low-cost housing, health care, and schooling 
assistance, among other services. 30 Later, the coalition opened the Social 
Welfare Agency to help the needy by connecting them with those able to 
provide assistance. With thirty-five branch offices, the agency regularly 
aided twenty-five thousand families. 31 The PLO in the refugee camps in Leb-
anon provided services to orphans, refugees, and the wounded early in its 
tenure. 32 Other PLO institutions concentrated on education and child care, 
including extensive prenatal and postnatal care, and kindergartens. Educa-
tional programs included vocational and technical training, for women as 
well as men, summer camps, sports, and literacy drives. The organization 
provided medical and dental care, while prosthetic services were advanced 
to the degree that the devices were manufactured in the camps.33 Health-
care institutions for the Druze militia began with providing food for fight-
ers,3'' and care for the dependents of militia fighters followed. Basic services 
and education expenditures came to constitute between 40 and 45 percent of 
the Druze group's budget. With the aid of international and national agen-
cies, this militia built new schools, started economic ventures, and repaired 
homes and businesses. 35 It provided loans, monthly family support, grants, 
scholarships, and payments to thousands of families that had lost a bread-
winner in the war. 36 
Hizbullah is well-known for its social services and management of the 
neglected southern areas of Beirut. The organization rebuilt almost eleven 
thousand institutions, homes, schools, shops, hospitals, infirmaries, mosques, 
agricultural cooperatives, and cultural centers and constructed seventy-eight 
new ones as of 2004. It provides health care at cheap, subsidized rates; finan-
cial aid for education; and low-cost loans.37 Three-quarters of a million people 
were aided in its health centers in 2004. 38 The movement provides agricul-
tural, irrigation, and veterinary services and has established a free transport 
system and a restaurant with free meals to the poor, in addition to low-price 
supermarkets, pharmacies, and clinics. Its participation in local government 
and provision of social services earned a United Nations best practices award 
for the municipality.39 Currently the organization is engaged in wholesale re-
construction of homes and infrastructure in its area that were damaged or 
destroyed during the 2006 war. 
The Creation of Non-state Authority: Religion, Violence, 
and Identity as Mechanisms of Legitimating Power 
All these services provided outside the purview of the state are backed up 
by ideological justifications for rule. Religion is a prominent source of legiti-
mation, as it encompasses built-in morality, access to resources, a legacy of 
influence, and concerns for justice. Religion has established practical and 
normative systems that include leaders and authority networks and methods 
of communication to the community, as well as symbols and rituals linked to 
collective identity.40 Public services are often organized through mosques, as 
they function as a substitute community center, a role common to religious 
institutions globally. Social services from child care to training programs take 
place at the mosque, and often sports clubs and educational classes as well.4 1 
Paired with charity and social welfare aid, as it frequently is, religion draws on 
the additional prestige of these socially rewarded tasks. 
The centrality of morality and rectitude in religion is a boon to authority-
seekers, for whom a reputation for fairness and honesty is another key attri-
bute important in their local authority. Businesses utilize religious idioms to 
benefit from the honest reputation and social status accorded to the religious 
and also to distinguish themselves from other players in the economic field. 
In this guise, Islam has been used to target markets by creating a consumer 
niche of goods with the Islamic label from Islamic vacations to Mecca Cola,42 
just as businesses in the United States promote themselves using the Christian 
fish symbol to indicate their religiosity. Various versions oflslam provide this 
religious distinction, not solely Salafi or strict Sunni Islam (most commonly 
referred to as fundamentalist). Mystic Sufi orders provide networks and legiti-
mation, as do Shi'a groups and smaller sects. Indeed, religion as an alternative 
authority can also trump gender and age hierarchies. As young girls in Leba-
non became experts in religious knowledge, their familial status changed as 
their parents deferred to this knowledge.43 Similarly, young men with exper-
tise in Islam increased their weight in the family and extended this influence 
to regulating the behavior and social relations of female family members.44 
The legitimating power of religion works for both residents and the state, 
as both consider wealth and ownership to be justified when the individual has 
contributed significantly to charities and religious endowments. In one case, 
certain citizens whose status in the community was rising funded the con-
struction of mosques, thereby insuring themselves against both raids by state 
police on their untitled homes and their neighbors' resentment.45 The mosque 
is particularly central to the life of the community in unplanned areas with-
out state amenities because social services are concentrated there. Religion 
and morality are also used to compel adherence to codes of social behavior. In 
cases of disputes over ownership or use of a building or the payment of rent, 
for example, local notables can invoke religious tenets to persuade disputants 
to settle their differences or comply with community norms.46 
As prominent and pervasive as religious legitimation is, it is by no means 
the sole source of validation for the exercise of power. Violence that is per-
ceived to be necessary to preserve a community against enemies is a source 
of legitimacy for thugs and militias, and the construction of such enemies 
justifies the violent regulation of public space. Militias use their representa-
tion of the fight against the adversary to justify their power in the commu-
nity, which they typically back up with a political ideology that can be secular 
or religious. This sort of legitimacy was amply demonstrated in the positive 
opinions of Hizbullah by Lebanese across sectarian lines at the height of the 
2006 war with Israel.47 
Another form of violent authority rests on brute force or thuggishness, 
used in conjunction with good reputation or religiosity. The reputation of the 
thug for fairness and the value of his organizing skills justify his arrogation 
of power. Where no moral or civil authority exists, as in much of the Pales-
tinian West Bank territories today, or where individuals do not acquiesce to 
the local authority, residents may resort to the services of thugs or specialists 
in violence.48 Specialists in violence can be called on to organize taxi lines at 
checkpoints, for instance, to prevent cutting in line or "stealing" other peo-
ple's business. In another example, masked youths in the Palestinian intifada 
enforced decrees by the political organizations and made sure retail shops 
stayed open.49 These street-level authorities are often well disciplined, hier-
archical, and orderly and can be composed of individuals from respectable 
professions who have formal jobs. 
Common identity is a third source of legitimation. As with the other forms 
of justification for power, identity legitimation is effective only when it is in-
voked in conjunction with the kinds of services and institutions described 
above. Hometown and lineage groups and militias promote identities distinct 
from the rest of society or a specified enemy. While group identity rational-
izes limiting leadership to those within the particular group, it does not indi-
cate who in the group will lead. In hometown and kin groups, members elect 
and judge leaders on the basis of their ability to provide employment and their 
useful connections with state institutions. 
Militias in control of territory often use education and the media in their 
attempts to establish legitimacy through ideological identity. The militias in 
Lebanon, for example, changed school textbooks, resurrected or outright cre-
ated a particular version of history, and promoted new cultural rituals to con-
solidate their position as a legitimate authority. Dozens of television stations 
operated unofficially during the war, in addition to numerous new radio sta-
tions and newspapers operated by the various factions. The Lebanese Forces 
ran a weekly paper, a radio station, and the Lebanese Broadcasting Company, 
a television station that continued after the war as one of the top stations in 
Lebanon and the Arab world. 50 
Identity promotion did not stop there. The Lebanese Forces advanced a 
"Phoenician" ideology, asserting the essential differences of Lebanese Chris-
tians as non-Arabs and their constitution as a separate nation. 51 For the 
public schools under their jurisdiction, by contrast, the Druze revised exist-
ing textbooks and published history books of their own that played down 
this competing Phoenician history of the Lebanese Forces and expanded 
on Druze history and culture throughout Lebanon and neighboring coun-
tries. Druze education emphasized socialist values, sacrifice for the country, 
and scouting, while their cultural promotion extended to a new flag and the 
establishment of museums.52 
The PLO for its part has promoted a new culture and distinct sense of 
nationhood through the arts, theater, and traditional crafts.53 Holidays and 
celebrations focused on an abstract Palestinian nation, celebrating Land Day, 
important battles, and the fight with the Jordanian regime, and streets were 
renamed for political factions. 54 Hizbullah uses numerous rituals and symbols 
to promote both the uniqueness and validity of the Shi'a identity in Lebanon; 
the group has also transformed and tamed religious rituals, eliminated their 
excesses, and closely regulates events. 55 Festivals, parades, and cultural muse-
ums reinforce the separate identity of the inhabitants of the southern Beirut 
suburbs, whose spatial territory is clearly demarked by Hizbullah signs. 56 
Conclusion 
Authority crea,tion and leadership in the Middle East are dynamic processes. 
In areas under the regulation of the state and outside it, new socioeconomic 
actors have arisen who offer essential services-policing or arbitration and 
social services-that garner them influence in the community. The legitima-
tion of power holders' influence among the residents draws upon religion, 
identity, or violence. Newly successful individuals, whether financially pros-
perous or violently skilled, must demonstrate service, honesty, and fairness to 
the community before being accorded authority. 
Residents and authorities in unregulated areas are not necessarily opposed 
to the state or a threat to it. For many residents, opposition to the state is 
a result of fearing state actions against their untitled housing and informal 
jobs. The state, with the potential to take away housing and fine or imprison 
residents, represents only a threat to these people. In most cases these fears are 
correct. Unable to differentiate among residents, state officials apply uniform 
punishments against all residents of these areas when they assert state author-
ity. Areas have been leveled or residents rounded up by police. No benefits 
flow from the state, no services, policing, or infrastructure. Residents' apoliti-
cal desire to avoid the state can align with criminal and terrorist groups' own 
goals, and common cause can be made in the shared attempt to evade the 
state. Political stances opposed to the state can arise from this dynamic. 
Lacking an alliance with groups that have political or criminal goals, resi-
dents and their leaders are willing to be co-opted by the state rather than 
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compete with it. Local leaders serve as intermediaries for the state in connect-
ing with residents and in return can satisfy their social status desires through 
elected or administrative positions. Indeed, even many political and violent 
actors have been incorporated into state institutions with the right incentive 
of decentralized autonomy for the region. States in the Middle East have not 
pressed their authority onto unregulated areas because of their lack of ca-
pacity economically and administratively. States have been unable to keep 
pace with rapid urbanization while at the same time shrinking their realm 
of service provision. The need to decrease state expenditure translates into 
withdrawing services and state administration from many areas, or not es-
tablishing them to begin with in new urban neighborhoods considered to be 
low priority. Social groups key to the state are unaffected: gated housing and 
private goods substitute for state services among the upper classes. In other 
areas, nongovernmental groups take up economic and infrastructure tasks. 
This corresponds both to an ideological turn to a small state with civil so-
ciety taking up the slack and to the state's fiscal inability to furnish services 
itself. In still other cases, armed groups politically dispute the legitimacy of 
the state. Overt opposition to the state does not always translate into pitched 
battles for state overthrow, however; many rebel groups are happy to rule their 
small areas without expanding, and states unable to route them find a hands-
off accommodation acceptable. 
Notes 
The yiews expressed in this chapter are the author's alone and do not represent the Na-
val Postgraduate School, the U.S. government, or any other institutional affiliation. 
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8 Immigration and Subterranean 
Sovereignty in South African Cities 
Loren B. Landau and Tamlyn Monson 
Border control- entry, exit, and movement within a tcrritory--is inextricahlv 
tied to globally dominant definitions of spatial control and sovereignty. Under 
the Manichean rubric that informs much work on contemporary governance, 
where states are unable t\l systematically regulate movement into and within 
space, such spaces appear as only partially governcd. 1 However, such dcsigna· 
tions arc premised on a state-centric perspective of g1iYernance that ignores 
(\ther critical forms of regulation and control that emerge when state power 
is inconsistent or when states act in "irregular" ways.' Through its "worrn's-
ieve" view, this chapter argues that the various 3ctnrs involved in regu bting 
human mobility-states, citizens, and migrants themselves-- act as ciltilh'sls 
for transforming the practice of sovereignty. \!\There public commitment<. tn 
law are questionable and enforcement institutions weak, socially rooted r':'.-
gimes of control have emerged to reg11bte what might nul\\ardly aprc<H <h 
South Africa's ungoverned spaces. 
The chapter explores two different :;ub1vtional regulatory rcgirnl"; th;it 
have evolved around the regulation ofh11nnn mobility. The first involve., ;\f-
rican immigrants who have dev,·loped and m;1intilincd subtcrr;rncan cco11<1 
mies and system'> of privatized regul0tnry urders intended tn undermine ;md 
frmtratc st3te mechanisms of mobility umtrol. \Vhilc the state (and st;11 ist 
analysts) may see these as pushing tow:ird ;marchy. they conuin within them 
informally and rnrnetimes cocrcivclv 'Y'tcmati7t·d [,1rms of control th:it ~'.l n-
er;1te important politic3] subjecti\·iti,_, ;111d i11tcr;1ctinns. !•fore'" ;•r, m.iiw of 
